How effective have Anti-Racism Campaigns been in eliminating Racism from English Football? (1970-2013)

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Abstract

Following several recent incidents of racial abuse in English football, both on the pitch and in the stands, the success levels of anti-racism campaigns have been called into question. As a consequence of these criticisms, this study aims to discover how effective anti-racism campaigns have been in eliminating racism from English football. Focus is placed on examining two specific organisations – Kick It Out and Football Unites, Racism Divides – to allow for a more detailed analysis of how successful these campaigns have been in eradicating racism from the men’s professional game.

As previous academic work on racism in football has largely been carried out by sociologists, this study also aims to add a new dimension to this topic by approaching it from a historical perspective. It is, therefore, a further objective of this piece to place the work of anti-racism campaigns within the wider socio-political context. This is of particular relevance as it is argued here that anti-racism campaigns can only effectively eradicate racism from football by tackling its societal causes.

This study provides evidence that KIO and FURD have, so far, been predominantly ineffective in eliminating racism from English football. This has largely been the result of an emphasis on suppressing the problem of overt racism through sanctions rather than using educative measures to challenge its societal causes. Additionally, the campaigns have been unsuccessful in removing institutional racism from a number of clubs, and the Football Association, who still seem less than fully committed to the anti-racist movement.
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List of Abbreviations

BACA - The Black and Asian Coaches Association
BAME – Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic
CRE – Commission for Racial Equality
EOPs – Equal opportunities policies
FA – Football Association
FURD – Football Unites, Racism Divides
KIO – Kick It Out
PFA – Professional Footballer’s Association
Introduction

Within eight days during October 2011, Luis Suarez and John Terry were both accused of racially abusing opponents on the field of play. These allegations, which were found to be true by the Football Association (FA), dramatically highlighted that racism is still fundamentally present within English football. Only a year later, several high-profile professional footballers, including Jason Roberts and Rio Ferdinand, boycotted Kick It Out’s anti-racism T-shirt campaign and raised serious questions about the success levels of these organisations.¹ These events have led to this study which aims to determine how effective anti-racism campaigns have been in eliminating racism from English football.

It is not possible to analyse the effectiveness of every anti-racism campaign in every aspect of English football. Therefore, this study will predominantly focus on the impact of two campaigns - Kick It Out (KIO) and Football Unites, Racism Divides (FURD) – in the men’s professional game. KIO has been chosen as the focal point of this piece as it is the flagship national anti-racism campaign. FURD provides a local example of the work which the organisations have done and was specifically selected due to its resource library in Sheffield. The breadth of sources available here has allowed for a comprehensive study of the organisation.

These campaigns were formed following the government’s failure to eliminate racism and discrimination in Britain despite successive pieces of ‘race relations legislation’.² The ineffectiveness of Acts in 1965, 1968 and 1976 to ‘tackle the root causes of racial inequality...in British society’, therefore, led to the creation of KIO, in 1993, and FURD, in

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1995, as some looked ‘beyond the channels of formal politics for a solution’.³ The Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) formed KIO in the belief that, by eliminating racism from football, it could also tackle the issue in ‘larger social and cultural contexts.’⁴ Similarly, in the wake of ‘a number of racist attacks upon Asian and Somali young people’, FURD believed that, by eradicating racism from within the game, it could solve local racial issues in Sheffield.⁵ Despite primarily focusing on how effective these campaigns have been in their central attempts to eliminate racism from within English football, it is also necessary to assess how far they have succeeded in achieving these wider objectives of challenging racism in society. This is because the two aims are closely related and John Barnes’s assertion, made in a lecture in May 2012, that ‘racism cannot leave football without first leaving society’, highlights this point.⁶

In order to achieve their goals, the two campaigns initially attempted to combat the overt racism among supporters which had become a feature of the game in the 1970s and 1980s. However, their aims have evolved over the last twenty years, as racism has taken a more covert form, and focus has shifted to racism among players and in the institutional structures of the game. The lack of Asian players as well as Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) supporters, football managers and administrators is now a major cause of concern. As a result, this study will focus on evaluating the effectiveness of KIO and FURD in eliminating racism from supporters, players, clubs and the FA.

This piece is hugely important in filling a void in the study of racism in football as very few academics have focused on evaluating the work of anti-racism projects. Jon Garland and Michael Rowe’s *Racism and Anti-Racism in Football*, from 2001, offers the last major study which substantially focused on the issue and, therefore, this piece aims to extend research in this area by twelve years. Additionally, because previous work on these campaigns has predominantly been undertaken by sociologists, this study, by taking a historical approach, is able to engage further with the wider socio-political context. This piece will, therefore, analyse how societal and political issues caused, and continue to cause, racism in football as well as how they have continued to influence the work of anti-racism campaigns. In achieving these aims, this study will make a valuable contribution to a topic which is likely to receive more attention in the coming years as a result of recent controversies.

Due to the lack of secondary sources which offer a substantial focus on the work of anti-racism campaigns, the annual reports of both organisations have been vital in understanding their aims and activities. In evaluating the effectiveness of KIO and FURD, a variety of sources, such as newspaper reports, sociological surveys, books and journals, have been invaluable in offering statistics and evidence which highlight their successes and failures. In addition to this breadth of sources, interviews were sought with players and staff from local football clubs including Norwich City, Ipswich Town and Cambridge United. These interviews would have allowed footballers, from the Premier League, Championship and Conference, to give their opinions on whether they felt KIO and FURD have been effective in eliminating racism from football. Unfortunately, these clubs were reluctant or unable to organise any interviews. Consequently, this piece of work will rely on printed and digital sources.
The following study consists of three chapters each assessing the effectiveness of KIO and FURD in eliminating different forms of racism from football. Chapter one focuses on how successful anti-racist organisations have been in eradicating racial issues concerning supporters. It argues that KIO and FURD have been partially effective in reducing overt racist abuse in stadia through the imposition of sanctions. However, it notes that both campaigns have been ineffective in educating adult supporters and have, therefore, failed to challenge racism in society. This has resulted in continuing evidence of overt racial abuse from fans. Secondly, it is argued that KIO and FURD have only been partially successful in increasing the participation of BAME supporters to a standard reflective of the multicultural composition of society.

Chapter two focuses on the ineffectiveness of KIO and FURD in eliminating racial concerns in relation to players. It argues that KIO has, so far, failed to introduce appropriate sanctions and educational measures to prevent players from engaging in racial abuse. It also notes that both organisations have failed to achieve their aim of increasing Asian participation as professional footballers. Despite FURD effectively engaging Asian players at an amateur level, KIO has failed to encourage enough clubs to introduce scouting networks and initiatives which will lead to this increase.

Finally, the third chapter analyses how successfully KIO and FURD have challenged institutional racism in the game. It focuses on how ineffective the campaigns have been in addressing the structural barriers, also prevalent in society, which still prevent BAME people from progressing into positions within the boardroom and football management. It is argued that this is largely the result of KIO failing to encourage enough clubs to attain the campaign’s Equality Standard.
This study aims to highlight that, despite making progress in certain areas, anti-racism campaigns have, so far, been predominantly ineffective in eliminating racism from English football. Racial abuse still occurs in stadia and on the field of play while BAME people are heavily under-represented in almost every section of the English game. This piece also aims to convey that racism within football cannot be viewed as an isolated phenomenon. This is because the racial concerns experienced are reflective of wider issues which permeate all levels of society. For this reason, KIO and FURD will continue to be ineffective in eradicating racism unless they can successfully mobilise football as a vehicle to challenge attitudes in wider society.
Chapter One – Racism and Supporters

Les Back, Tim Crabbe and John Solomos correctly observe that ‘until the mid-1990s the debate about racism in football was focused almost exclusively on the problem of fan behaviour’. In fact, challenging racism was initially grouped into the wider objective of dealing with hooliganism and fascism. This focus is reflective of anti-racism movements formed in the 1970s and 1980s generally, such as Rock Against Racism, who were largely formed as a response to ‘the growth of political support for the National Front.’

Beginning in the late 1990s, sociologists successfully began to try and dismantle this ‘racist/hooligan couplet’ and expand the debate to more covert forms of racism among players and administrators. However, although KIO and FURD have recently focused on these subtle forms of racism, their initial preoccupation with the racist hooligan has limited their effectiveness in eliminating racism among supporters. This chapter argues that, by concentrating on eradicating behavioural forms of racism, through sanctions, anti-racism campaigns have failed to show an awareness of the broader societal causes. Ultimately, through choosing not to adopt an educational approach aimed at adult supporters, KIO and FURD have been ineffective in challenging racism in society. This failure has led racial abuse to persist within crowds which are continually under-representative of the multicultural make-up of society.

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Overt Supporter Racism

By comparing contemporary football with that of the 1970s and 1980s, it is apparent that, through the use of sanctions, KIO and FURD have had large amounts of success in reducing the level of overt racial abuse within stadia. However, these campaigns have been less effective in challenging supporter’s underlying racist attitudes. This has resulted in the continuing, though less frequent, racial abuse from fans which is reflected in the findings of Jamie Cleland and Ellis Cashmore. They discovered that, during the 2011-12 season, half of all fans were ‘still witnessing or experiencing some form of racism.’ This illustrates that, despite KIO and FURD’s success in reducing overt racial abuse, it is impossible for campaigns to effectively eliminate racism from football supporters without challenging the racism which is still ingrained in English society.

This societal racism, which was overtly expressed in stadia during the 1970s and 1980s, has its roots in the British Empire and ‘the legacy of colonialism and slavery’. Despite the Empire’s decline, racism persisted and the ‘influx’ of formerly colonised peoples from the Caribbean and India to Britain, after 1948, strained racial tensions. Racism was ‘institutionalized, legitimized, and nationalized’ in parliament during the 1960s as ‘Tory and Labour politicians progressively accommodated themselves to racism’ for fear of losing votes to fascist organisations. The Commonwealth Immigration Bill of 1962 is evidence of this as ‘its intention was to restrict migration to Britain on the basis of a colour-coded...

British politics retained racist undertones during the 1980s with ‘social conflict and economic inequalities in Margaret Thatcher’s Britain’ and this was compounded by race riots which occurred in Brixton and Toxeth in 1981. With this societal racism in mind, Phil Vaseli correctly acknowledges that racism occurred within stadia as it ‘reflected the tone of disrespect by Britain’s rulers to people of colour’. This societal racism was, therefore, the cause of regular and intense overt racial abuse which footballers, such as Cyrille Regis and John Barnes, experienced during the 1970s and 1980s. Barnes, recalling his experiences, remembers how ‘opposing fans from countless clubs…showered me with spit and abuse’ and how ‘banana after banana came flying from the terrace throngs towards me’. These experiences are highlighted in the famous photograph, shown above, which captured the moment when Barnes back-heeled a banana, which had been thrown from the stands, off the pitch during a match between

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15 Bebber Violence and Racism in Football p. 178
16 Vaseli Colouring Over The White Line p. 132
Everton and Liverpool in 1988. Regis shares similar memories by stating that overt racism from the crowd, including ‘monkey chants’, was ‘commonplace’.\(^\text{18}\)

By focusing on these experiences, it is clear that open expressions of racist abuse in stadia have declined dramatically. However, this has been achieved through prohibiting racist behaviour rather than challenging its societal causes. Even before the formation of KIO and FURD, anti-racist supporter groups and the government were targeting overt racist behaviour through means other than education. Leeds Fans United Against Racism and Fascism, founded in 1987, provides an example of the supporter campaigns, which were influenced by the Anti-Nazi League and Anti-Fascist Action. These organisations were influential in trying to remove racism from football but, as Garland and Rowe highlight, all too often ‘physical confrontation’ was seen as the way to fight racism due to its association with far-right groups, such as the National Front and Combat 18.\(^\text{19}\)

Overt racism was only considerably reduced with a change of attitude in parliament as ‘multicultural integration became the goal of many British politicians in the 1990s’.\(^\text{20}\)

However, rather than using educative means, the government attempted to prevent racism among supporters through legislation. Tragedies, such as the Bradford City stadium fire and Heysel disaster, of May 1985, and the Hillsborough disaster, of 1989, initially made politicians aware of issues within football. Significantly, the Popplewell enquiry, which investigated the Bradford City stadium fire, and the subsequent report, by Lord Justice Taylor, into the Hillsborough disaster, both made reference to racism within the game. The report into Hillsborough specifically recommended that ‘chanting obscene or racist abuse’

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\(^\text{18}\) Regis, Cyrille, *Cyrille Regis: My Story* (London: Andre Deutsch, 2010), p. 77

\(^\text{19}\) Garland, Jon and Michael Rowe, *Racism and Anti-Racism in Football* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 73

\(^\text{20}\) Bebber *Violence and Racism in Football* p. 175
be made a ‘specific offence’. The government recognised this when the Football (Offences) Act was passed, in 1991, making it illegal to ‘take part at a designated football match in chanting of an indecent or racialist nature.’ Although the arrest and prosecution numbers have ‘remained very low’, this Act, which was modified in September 1999 to target individual expressions of racism, was an important step in decreasing overt racist behaviour.

Additionally, the Hillsborough disaster instigated the ‘McDonaldization’ of football grounds through the implementation of all-seated stadia and CCTV. These key changes reduced overt racist behaviour as supporters began watching football in ‘highly individualized and policed settings’. Thus, when KIO was formed, in 1993, the regular and intense racial abuse of previous decades was already declining. This explains why KIO chose to continue previous anti-racist work by focusing on restricting supporter behaviour rather than using educational measures. This concentration is evident from points one, two, three, four, seven and eight of the ten point plan, created upon the campaign’s inception, in appendix one.

By enhancing the presence of racially aware police officers and stewards, encouraging clubs to publically condemn racist abuse and ensuring sanctions are imposed against offenders; KIO has been successful in further reducing overt racism inside English football grounds. Despite focus recently shifting towards more covert forms of racism, overt expressions still remain a key concern. This is evident from the campaign’s ‘One Game, One Community’ weeks of action in which ‘1,000 events take place...including a day of action at all 92

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23 Bebber Violence and Racism in Football p. 184
24 Back, Crabbe and Solomos The Changing Face of Football p. 197
25 Bebber Violence and Racism in Football p. 234
This initiative publicises the campaign and keeps supporters aware that racist behaviour is unacceptable. Additionally, KIO ‘continues to operate a reporting hotline service’ so that fans can complain about discriminative incidents. Recently, KIO has also assisted the FA in creating ‘English Football’s Inclusion and Anti-Discrimination Plan’. This aims to improve steward’s responses to discrimination, increase the consistency of sanctions and guarantee that Police deal with offences ‘appropriately’.

However, despite succeeding in reducing overt racial abuse, KIO has been ineffective in fully eliminating racism from supporters. The restrictive measures utilised may force fans to keep their racial prejudices silent for ninety minutes, however they do nothing to challenge the racist attitudes present in society. Consequently, these views still inevitably cause overt racial abuse to emerge. To their credit, KIO have implemented some educative measures and even state in their latest annual report that ‘education is a fundamental part’ of their work. However, these initiatives have generally been aimed at young people rather than match-attending adult supporters. This bodes well for the future as young fans should be more racially aware. However, to truly be effective in eradicating racism, KIO must also challenge the attitudes of present adult supporters.

At a local level, FURD has encountered comparable problems to KIO. FURD also had an initial focus on fan behaviour and aimed to ensure supporters could ‘watch

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29 Ibid., p. 7
football...without fear of racial abuse and harassment’.\textsuperscript{31} One of the primary ways FURD has attempted to achieve this is through their ‘Anti-Racist Days’ which have occurred annually at Sheffield United’s Bramall Lane since 1997.\textsuperscript{32} More recently, these events have also taken place at Sheffield Wednesday’s Hillsborough and Barnsley’s Oakwell. Like KIO’s weeks of action, the goal is to raise awareness of the unacceptable nature of racism among fans. Steven Bradbury also highlights that FURD has assisted Sheffield United in displaying anti-racist slogans on pitch-side advertising hoardings and training their stewards in ‘cultural awareness’.\textsuperscript{33} All of these measures, alongside KIO’s national initiatives, have led to a reduction in overt racism in football stadia in the Sheffield area.

However, as with KIO, FURD has been ineffective in educating adult supporters. FURD has commendably aimed to ‘challenge racism through antiracist education’ but, despite this, its initiatives are largely aimed at young people.\textsuperscript{34} This important work will leave future season ticket holders more racially educated but, by not challenging the attitudes of current supporters, FURD cannot hope to completely eliminate racism within Sheffield’s football stadia.

The problem with these campaigns, therefore, has been their overriding aim to restrain fan behaviour rather than educate adult supporters. The initial image of the racist hooligan led the two campaigns to the ‘unhelpful assumption’ that problems of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} ‘Unity: Football Unites, Racism Divides, Newsletter 2007’, http://www.furd.org/resources/UNITY.pdf [Accessed 22/01/2013], p. 8
\item \textsuperscript{34} ‘Football Unites Racism Divides, Annual Report 2000-2001’ Part 1 p. 5
\end{itemize}
racism within football could ‘be reduced to that of football hooliganism’.\textsuperscript{35} However, this view failed to recognise that racism is expressed by those from all sections of society. Anti-racism campaigns, and academics, have broadened their interpretations of racism within football but their early focuses have clearly impacted on their effectiveness in tackling the issue. As a result, restrictions on fan behaviour took precedence over education and, therefore, overt racism has successfully been reduced while supporters’ attitudes have not necessarily changed.

The societal racism previously discussed still exists, therefore, and has evolved since the 1970s and 1980s. The overt expressions of racism that previously occurred are now inconsistent with the ‘norms of equality and democratic humanitarianism’ but, despite this, ‘the new power elites reproduce and legitimate covert everyday common-sense ideas of racism.’\textsuperscript{36} This has meant that the racial attitudes, which were previously expressed overtly, are still harboured in society in a less explicit way. This is evident from the ‘growing number’ of racially abusive messages to footballers, such as Micah Richards and Carlton Cole, on Twitter and other social media sites.\textsuperscript{37} Additionally, because these views have not been challenged by anti-racism campaigns, continuing racist attitudes still emerge in football stadia. A Sky Sports News investigation illustrates this as it uncovered ‘horrific racism’ by supporters at Burnley and Millwall in 2012.\textsuperscript{38}

Additionally, Islamophobia has emerged as a major source of racial tension. The murders of two Leeds United fans in Istanbul in April 2000 caused racial strains in the footballing community and the race riots of the summer of 2001, which occurred in Bradford, Oldham

\textsuperscript{35} Garland and Rowe \textit{Racism and Anti-Racism in Football} p. 88  
\textsuperscript{36} Bhavnani, Mirza and Meetoo \textit{Tackling the Roots of Racism} p. 52  
\textsuperscript{37} Cleland and Cashmore ‘Fans, Racism and British Football in the Twenty-First Century’  
and Burnley, showed evidence of ‘deep-rooted segregation’ in British society.\textsuperscript{39} The terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in September 2001 compounded this and left a deep mark on British society’s perception of Islam and the British-Asian population. This societal racism was evident in a match between Leeds United and Leicester City in 2002 in which Leeds fans chanted “You all live in a town full of Pakis” and aimed the chant “Turkish scum” at Muzzy Izzet.\textsuperscript{40} The subsequent London bombings, by young British-born Muslim men, in July 2005 ‘ushered in a renewed contestation with multiculturalism’.\textsuperscript{41} These attitudes were again exhibited when Newcastle United played Middlesbrough in December 2008 as Mido, an Egyptian international, was racially abused.\textsuperscript{42} Continuing marches by the English Defence League (EDL), such as the March 2013 protest in Manchester, confirm this continuing Islamophobia.\textsuperscript{43}

Without challenging these racist attitudes in society through educational initiatives, anti-racism campaigns have been ineffective in eliminating racism among football supporters. The sanctions advocated by KIO and FURD have been important in reducing overt racist behaviour within stadia. However, these measures have done little to change fans’ underlying racist attitudes which continue to cause expressions of racism to occur. To be effective in eliminating racism, it is necessary for anti-racism campaigns to take an educational approach and simultaneously achieve their wider goal of tackling societal racism.

\textsuperscript{41} Bhavnani, Mirza and Meetoo Tackling the Roots of Racism p. 47
Under-representation of Black and Minority Ethnic Supporters

In 1998, the Football Task Force correctly observed that the ‘threat of racism is a powerful deterrent to black and Asian people’ wishing to attend football matches.\textsuperscript{44} Despite anti-racism campaigns being successful in reducing overt racism in stadia, they have evidently not eliminated the problem. As discussed, societal racism still exists and this, alongside incidents of fans continuing to use racial abuse, means BAME supporters often do not feel welcome within predominantly white football crowds. Consequently, fifteen years on from the Football Task Force Report, the level of BAME fans attending games is not reflective of the multicultural make-up of England’s population. This section analyses how KIO and FURD have attempted to address this under-representation by encouraging clubs to connect with their local BAME communities. However, despite making progress, anti-racism campaigns have not been fully effective in making the multicultural make-up of English football crowds reflective of the complexion of wider society.

In the 1999 FA Premier League Fan Survey, 0.4% of supporters described themselves as coming from a ‘Black British background’, 0.5% came from a ‘British Asian background’ and a further 1.3% came from a ‘foreign’ background of some kind.\textsuperscript{45} Despite the survey admitting that it is ‘very hard to draw definitive conclusions’, these results suggest that only just over two per cent of Premier League crowds in 1999 were made up of BAME supporters.\textsuperscript{46} In contrast to these results, the 2001 census revealed that 8.7% of the

\textsuperscript{44} ‘Eliminating Racism From Football: A report by the Football Task Force’ (March 1998) \url{http://www.furd.org/resources/tfracism.pdf} [Accessed 18/01/2013], p. 15


\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
population of England and Wales was non-White.\(^6\) These results show the great disparity between the make-up of Premier League football crowds and the general population around the turn of the millennium.

KIO has attempted to address this under-representation since its inception in 1993. Its 1997/98 annual report confirms this as ‘increasing the participation of local minority communities within professional football clubs’ is listed under the campaign’s aims.\(^7\) KIO’s effort to reduce overt racism is one way in which the campaign has endeavoured to achieve this by making ‘Black and Asian supporters feel comfortable and safe in going to professional football as spectators.’\(^8\) As discussed, this tactic has been effective to an extent and BAME supporters are seemingly more comfortable in attending matches today than thirty years ago. However, the ineffectiveness of KIO in challenging societal racism has meant that BAME supporters can still feel excluded from football stadia as they do in wider society. In many ways, the under-representation of BAME football supporters is simply continuing evidence of the existence of ‘divided communities’ in England.\(^9\)

In order to combat this, alongside its attempts to eliminate overt racism, KIO has engaged in community schemes as a way of bridging the gap between ‘football authorities and groups that may have historically been excluded from the game.’\(^10\) In 2010/11, the campaign engaged in community forums with Sheffield Wednesday, Watford, Fulham, Gillingham and Leicester City.\(^11\) These measures show how KIO is endeavouring to encourage clubs to

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\(^8\) Ibid.

\(^9\) ‘Race ‘segregation’ caused riots’ BBC 11 December 2001

\(^10\) ‘Making an impact across the game: Kick It Out Annual Review 2009-10’ p. 5

\(^11\) ‘Ambassadors for Change: Annual Review 2010-11’ p. 6
interact with their communities and attract new fans, including those from BAME backgrounds. The campaign can only do so much, however, and it is the responsibility of the club to maintain links with its community.

Locally, FURD has attempted to increase the ‘participation of ethnic minority young people in football as...spectators’ at matches involving Sheffield-based teams.53 Their 2000-2001 annual report noted that the local city council ward of Sharrow had an ethnic minority population of 44% but, despite this, only one per cent of the crowd attending a match between Sheffield United and Bolton Wanderers in November 1996 were black or Asian.54 On top of trying to remove overt racism, FURD has implemented strategies to expand the BAME following of its local professional clubs.

The use of Community Days at Sheffield United has been an important part of ‘building bridges between the club and its local ethnic minority communities’ since May 1999.55 These ‘Anti-Racism Community’ Days have also taken place at Sheffield Wednesday since the millennium and at Barnsley since 2007.56 This has been supplemented by the distribution of free tickets to local BAME groups. In 1998, for example, 200 free match tickets were provided by Sheffield United in an attempt to raise the percentage of BAME fans.57 As a local campaign, FURD has been able to become more involved with its local community and has, therefore, maintained constant links between the Sheffield clubs and its BAME population.

54 Ibid., p. 4
55 Bradbury Football Unites, Racism Divides p. 44
Unfortunately, there are no available statistics to measure the success of FURD in increasing the multicultural make-up of crowds at Bramall Lane, Hillsborough and other local professional teams. However, there are accessible statistics which enable a picture to be presented of the situation within the ninety-two professional clubs as a whole.

The Office for National Statistics revealed in December 2012 that, in 2011, eighty-six per cent of the population of England and Wales was ‘White’.\textsuperscript{58} With this in mind, the Premier League’s annual report from 2008/9 reveals that crowds are beginning to reflect the multicultural society we live in as 12 per cent of match attending fans described themselves as BAME.\textsuperscript{59} This shows nearly a ten per cent increase from the equivalent survey ten years earlier and indicates that anti-racism campaigns have been largely effective in this change. There are still disparities between different clubs and some continually under-represent their BAME communities. However, others, such as Arsenal who, in 2007/08, had fourteen per cent of their fans describing themselves as ‘non-white’, are progressing toward a more accurate representation of their surrounding area.\textsuperscript{60}

Unfortunately, despite progress in the Premier League, the Football League supporters survey from 2008 reveals that ninety-four per cent of its respondents were ‘White British’.\textsuperscript{61} These figures show that outside the Premier League, crowds still under-represent the multicultural make-up of their communities. Therefore, despite anti-racism campaigns being effective in encouraging clubs to make progress, KIO and FURD have not been fully effective

\textsuperscript{58} ‘Ethnicity and National Identity in England and Wales 2011’ p. 1
\textsuperscript{61} ‘The Football League Supporters Survey 2008’, \url{http://www.football-league.co.uk/staticFiles/d3/f5/0/,10794~128467,00.pdf} [Accessed 12/04/2013], p. 77
in enabling English football crowds at all professional levels to reflect the multicultural composition of society.

Conclusion

Despite making progress, KIO and FURD have been relatively ineffective in eliminating racism within football in relation to supporters. This is largely the result of using measures which attempt to suppress the problem of overt racist abuse rather than solve it. Without using educative measures to tackle racism in society, anti-racism campaigns will be unable to prevent the underlying attitudes of supporters from emerging as racist expressions in stadia. Additionally, while racism remains unchallenged in society, and the campaigns fail to form long-term links between all professional clubs and their communities, local areas will remain racially divided. This creates an environment in which BAME supporters will feel excluded from attending matches alongside predominantly white fan groups.
Chapter Two – Racism and Players

No previous academic work has focused specifically on the issue of racial abuse between professional footballers. This study does so by arguing that anti-racism campaigns have been ineffective in eliminating racism between players through a lack of appropriate sanctions and educational measures. This chapter also focuses on the widely researched under-representation of Asian players. However, instead of fully exploring the reasons why this is the case, this piece focuses on the role of anti-racism campaigns in addressing the issue. Ultimately, KIO has been ineffective in ensuring that clubs have the correct scouting networks and initiatives in place to aid the development of Asian players.

Racial Abuse on the Field of Play

In the two years before this work’s completion, there were two high-profile cases of player on player racism in which both accused professionals were found guilty by the FA. The allegations made against Suarez and Terry, in October 2011, brought the issue of racism to prominence and made it clear that KIO has been less than effective in eliminating racist abuse between professional players in English football.

The autobiographies of Regis and Barnes are evidence that the Suarez and Terry situations are not new phenomena. Overt racism occurred, in the 1970s and 1980s, between players just as it did among supporters. These expressions were deemed acceptable by many belonging to a generation in which discrimination in employment and housing was legal until the 1968 Race Relations Act. The overtly racist nature of politics, discussed in the previous chapter, also led to the attitudes exhibited by footballers in this period. As a consequence of the perceived normality of abuse used by professionals, it is difficult to gage
the extent to which it occurred. This is because incidents were not readily reported by players or deemed newsworthy. Consequently, autobiographies are vital in gaining an insight into the extent of racism indulged in by professionals in this period. Regis, who played professionally between 1977 and 1996, states that he received ‘very few comments from rival players’ and ‘was only ever racially abused on the pitch twice.’

Barnes, who played professionally between 1981 and 1999, offers a different experience as he states that ‘on the field, so many white players called me ‘black bastard’ that I developed an immunity to it.’ Despite the disparity between these two accounts, they both reveal that player on player racial abuse was occurring decades before KIO’s inception.

Point five of a ten point plan, contained in KIO’s annual report from the 1997/98 season, shows that the campaign was aware of this problem of racism amongst players. This point aimed to address the issue by encouraging clubs to ‘take disciplinary action against players who engage in racial abuse.’ This initial stance reflects how the campaign attempted to eliminate racism from supporters through sanctions rather than education. However, this initiative has been almost totally ineffective in reducing the problem between players as clubs have been unwilling to appropriately discipline stars charged with racial abuse. This is most evident in the Suarez and Terry cases.

Despite being charged by the FA, banned for eight matches and fined £40,000 for racially abusing Patrice Evra, Liverpool FC publically supported Suarez rather than disciplining him.

This support was most obviously displayed when the Liverpool squad wore Suarez T-Shirts in

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62 Regis Cyrille Regis p. 98
63 Barnes John Barnes p. 93
65 ‘The Football Association and Luis Suarez: Reasons of the Regulatory Commission’ (December 2011) [http://www.furd.org/resources/FA%20v%20Suarez%20Written%20Reasons%20of%20Regulatory%20Commission.pdf] [Accessed 18/01/2013], p. 4
a pre-match warm-up. Throughout this, the club maintained that ‘Suarez did not commit any racist act’. Terry was also charged with racially abusing an opponent but only banned for four matches and fined £220,000. Chelsea FC did impose further disciplinary action but the extent of this punishment has not been publically disclosed. However, despite the club recognising that Terry racially abused a fellow professional, he remains Chelsea’s captain showing the lacklustre nature of punishments. These prominent examples are evidence that point five of KIO’s plan has still not been effectively implemented and, therefore, has not achieved its desired result of discouraging players from using racism.

KIO has also been ineffective in encouraging the FA to impose appropriate sanctions against players found to have used racial abuse. In 1998, a report from the Football Task Force, which KIO contributed to, revealed the aim to ‘amend FA disciplinary rules to recognise racist abuse on and off the pitch as a distinct offence punishable by separate and severe disciplinary measures’. However, the boycott of KIO’s campaign T-shirt by Premier League footballers from eight clubs, during its One Game, One Community weeks of action in October 2012, was largely a response to KIO’s failure in getting these severe sanctions implemented. These players were aggrieved that Terry was only banned for four games, as opposed to Suarez’s eight, and only fined £220,000. This punishment, imposed by the FA,

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66 Is Football Racist?, Victory Television, BBC Three, 16 July 2012
70 ‘Eliminating Racism From Football: A report by the Football Task Force’ p. 4
71 ‘Anti-racism group wants Kick It Out boycott players to be heard’ BBC 22 October 2012
did not send out a message of no tolerance as the fine was easily payable by a couple of weeks of Terry’s wages and the length of the ban was only a game more than that of a straight red card.

Lord Herman Ouseley, chairman of KIO, is correct, however, in asserting that it represents some sort of progress from previous decades that the FA investigated the Suarez and Terry cases ‘with an amazing degree of thoroughness’. This is evident from the way in which accusations of racial abuse against players were dealt with during the 1990s. Ian Wright alleged that, during a match at Old Trafford in November 1996, he was racially abused by the Manchester United goalkeeper Peter Schmeichel. Likewise, Stan Collymore accused the Liverpool defender, Steve Harkness, of racially abusing him during a game in February 1998. Neither Wright nor Collymore were satisfied with how the incidents were dealt with by referees, the FA or the Professional Footballer’s Association (PFA) and KIO, which was still in its infancy, was ineffective in addressing these issues.

The FA ‘ruled that it could not act’ in the Collymore case as ‘it was one player’s word against the other’. In response to how the incident was handled, Collymore calls it a ‘cosy little cover-up’ and states that it left him ‘feeling disgusted and disillusioned with football’s ability to police itself on race.’ Despite being an improvement, the fact that the FA now investigates cases of racial abuse should be expected and is only a sign of minimal progress. Until appropriate sanctions are consistently imposed against players, professionals will not

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76 Hattenstone ‘Racism in football: putting the boot in’ Guardian 13 July 2012
77 Collymore Stan p. 80
be largely discouraged from using racist language. In failing to achieve the imposition of these punishments, KIO has proved to be ineffective in eliminating racism amongst players.

Although the use of harsh punishments would discourage players from engaging in racism, as it has discouraged supporters, it would not alter players’ underlying attitudes. As previously discussed, racism still endures in wider society and this explains why overt expressions continue to emerge on the field of play. The use of education can be a powerful tool for KIO in eliminating racism among players and, more recently, the campaign has utilised this. This is evident from KIO’s partnership with the Premier League and PFA to provide all young academy players with a ‘race awareness training programme’. This course is designed to ‘highlight to players the importance of being a good role model’ as well as reiterating that ‘everyone involved in football has a role to play in ensuring equality and diversity is taken seriously.’ This measure is important in educating future players and could have a significant impact on the reduction of professionals indulging in racism. However, it does little to challenge the views of present players who hold racist attitudes borne out of society. As a result, while this initiative is likely be effective in the long term, in the short term it has little effect on eliminating this form of racism.

The limited effectiveness of KIO in eradicating racist abuse amongst players is evident from the fact that these controversies have persisted throughout the campaign’s existence. In the fifteen years between allegations involving Wright and Terry, the twelve incidents of alleged racial abuse in appendix two all occurred. It is more than probable that this does not even accurately reflect the true extent of racial abuse between professionals. Jason Roberts’


79 ‘Ambassadors for Change: Annual Review 2010-11’ p. 8
admission to the BBC in January 2012, that he was also racially abused but did not report it, suggests that several players have failed to report racism and that the extent of racial abuse exceeds what is openly admitted.\textsuperscript{80} FourFourTwo magazine’s January 2013 survey, of one hundred professional footballers in England and Scotland, confirms this as it reveals that over a quarter of players have witnessed a fellow professional being racist.\textsuperscript{81} It is yet another indication of KIO’s ineffectiveness in tackling the problem that many professionals do not feel the correct channels are in place to report racist abuse.

FURD has escaped focus and criticism in this section as it does not have the national profile to be able to heavily influence clubs and the FA in implementing sanctions against players. FURD does provide racial education for local youngsters involved in football and, if these young people make it to the professional game, this could be effective in reducing player on player racism. However, FURD does not have the same abilities as KIO in introducing education within professional clubs’ academies and, as such, it cannot hope to considerably influence the reduction of racial abuse between professionals.

Despite this chapter being heavily critical of KIO and the FA, the recently published ‘English Football’s Inclusion and Anti-Discrimination Plan’ offers hope that these organisations will finally address this form of racism effectively. The plan promises to ‘sanction clubs who repeatedly fail to sanction their employees...in relation to discriminatory language or behaviour’ and this will hopefully give rise to more appropriate and consistent punishments.\textsuperscript{82} The aim to introduce ‘standard clauses that address discriminatory language

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\textsuperscript{80} ‘Racism in football needs to be discussed – Jason Roberts’, BBC, 19 January 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/16630742 [Accessed 01/03/2013]
\textsuperscript{82} ‘English Football’s Inclusion and Anti-Discrimination Action Plan’ p. 4
\end{flushleft}
and behaviour’ in players contracts should also assist with this. Additionally, the ‘equality learning’ and ‘arrangements to support players who are new to English football and the British cultural environment’ should be important in reducing racial abuse through educational means. Finally, the aim to ensure ‘that players understand how to report their concerns about alleged discrimination’ should enable KIO and the FA to root out the problem.

That this form of racism has continued over a forty year period, from Regis’s experiences to the present day, acts as evidence that anti-racism campaigns have been ineffective in eliminating racial abuse between players. This is partially because KIO has failed to encourage professional clubs and the FA to introduce appropriate sanctions. The campaign has done more positive work in introducing educational measures but, again, these initiatives will be ineffective in the short term. Future plans offer a potentially more positive future but anti-racism campaigns have, since their inception, been ineffective in eliminating player on player racial abuse from English football.

Under-representation of Asian Players in the Professional Game

The use of racism by opponents, and the ‘white-centred’ player cultures which exist among teammates, are two credible explanations for the lack of Asian’s playing football professionally in England. Addressing this under-representation has been present on anti-racism campaign’s agendas for the majority of their existence and yet Kick It Out’s 2010/11 annual report reveals that, out of around three thousand professional players, there were

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83 Ibid., p. 11
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Back, Crabbe and Solomos, The Changing Face of Football p. 142
‘less than five’ from British Asian descent.\textsuperscript{87} This is despite the Office for National Statistics revealing that, in the same year, 7.5% of the population of England and Wales was made up of ‘Asian/Asian British’ people.\textsuperscript{88} Anti-racism campaigns have, therefore, seemingly been ineffective in addressing the lack of Asian players within professional English football.

Jas Bains and Raj Patel were influential in highlighting this under-representation through their 1996 study titled \textit{Asians Can’t Play Football}.\textsuperscript{89} The subsequent work by Bains and Sanjiev Johal, titled \textit{Corner Flags and Corner Shops}, further discredited this myth and revealed that ‘Asian boys were playing football in comparable numbers to all other groups’.\textsuperscript{90} Their absence from the professional game, despite this level of participation at amateur level, can be explained by Islamophobia and the shift towards ‘cultural racism’ in society.\textsuperscript{91}

The biological basis for racism, which initially blocked the rise of black players in the game, still persists as Asian players are viewed as ‘weak, effeminate’ and ‘unmanly’.\textsuperscript{92} However, the ‘new racism’ which views minorities as ‘culturally different’ is a major reason for Asian players’ exclusion from the game.\textsuperscript{93} The Asian community are seen to ‘place a far higher priority on family, education, religion and work than they do on sport’.\textsuperscript{94} Therefore, they are not scouted or given a chance by professional clubs who retain assumptions that Asians

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{87} ‘Ambassadors for Change: Annual Review 2010-11’ p. 17
\item \textsuperscript{88} ‘Ethnicity and National Identity in England and Wales 2011’ p. 3
\item \textsuperscript{89} Bains, Jas and Raj Patel, \textit{Asians Can’t Play Football} (Asian Social Development Agency: 1996)
\item \textsuperscript{90} Bains, Jas and Sanjiev Johal, \textit{Corner Flags and Corner Shops: The Asian Football Experience} (London: Phoenix, 1998), p. 48
\item \textsuperscript{91} Bhavnani, Mirza and Meetoo, \textit{Tackling the Roots of Racism} p. 11
\item \textsuperscript{93} Bhavnani, Mirza and Meetoo, \textit{Tackling the Roots of Racism} p. 11
\item \textsuperscript{94} Brimson, Dougie, \textit{Kicking Off: Why Hooliganism and Racism are Killing Football} (London: Headline Publishing Group, 2007), p. 181
\end{itemize}
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show no interest in football. This study, however, does not aim to investigate all of the reasons for the absence of Asian players. Instead, it will focus on how ineffective anti-racism campaigns have been in their attempts to increase Asian participation as professional players in English football.

KIO’s 1997/98 annual report reveals that it was an early aim of the campaign to promote ‘solutions to the marginalisation of Asians within the game’.95 One way in which KIO has attempted to do this is by encouraging professional clubs to ensure that ‘teams from all sections of the local community’ are regularly scouted.96 This idea was necessary as ‘all-Asian leagues’ rarely receive attention from professional clubs leaving the majority of Asian players without the opportunity to become professionals.97 However, KIO’s desires have largely been ignored with Leicester City acting as one of very few clubs who have named an Asian scout and coach to ‘help overcome some of the disadvantages faced by Asian children’.98

Another potential solution is KIO’s encouragement of schemes which identify talented Asian players. Leicester’s ‘Asian Sports Initiative’ and Sheffield’s ‘Streetwise scheme’, which was organised by FURD, were two early incarnations of this notion.99 West Ham, Charlton, Leyton Orient, Millwall and Bradford have also been named as participating in this area.100 More recently, KIO has supported ‘Chelsea FC’s inaugural Asian Soccer Star Search

96 ‘Eliminating Racism From Football: A report by the Football Task Force’ p. 4
97 Middleton, Nathan, Bend It Like Patel: A Critical Evaluation into the Lack of British Asian Participation in English Football (Geography BA, University of Manchester, 2009), http://www.furd.org/resources/BILP%20Convert%20(3).pdf [05/12/2012], p. 53
100 Vasili Colouring Over The White Line p. 174
project’.\(^{101}\) However, Kuljit Randhawa makes it clear, in a book published in 2011, that, still, ‘the talent identification programmes, scouting systems and academies at very few professional clubs engage with, or venture into, British Asian communities.’\(^{102}\) Consequently, it is clear that KIO has been ineffective in encouraging enough clubs to participate in the elimination of racial barriers which exclude Asian players.

Despite this, KIO continues to support the ‘National Asians in Football Forum’ and the issue has become a more prominent feature in the campaign’s work.\(^{103}\) In fact, in 2010/11, the ‘visibility of British Asians in football’ was identified as ‘a key area’ of KIO’s efforts.\(^{104}\) KIO also continues to endorse schemes such as the upcoming ‘Asian participation project’ in conjunction with Liverpool FC.\(^{105}\) Additionally, as part of a recent plan published by the FA, with input from KIO, a commitment was made to ‘implementing talent development programmes specifically in relation to Asian men and boys’.\(^{106}\) These impending measures may offer hope for future years but the fact that, in 2007, Dougie Brimson identified that only four Asian players have made it into football’s top division, and ‘just ten British-born Asian players’ were present in ‘twenty Premiership academies’, shows that, at least so far, KIO’s initiatives have been ineffective in increasing Asian participation as professionals.

Locally, FURD has also attempted to address the under-representation of Asian players by aiming to ‘increase the participation of ethnic minority young people in football as

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\(^{101}\) ‘Making an impact across the game: Kick It Out Annual Review 2009-10’ p. 22


\(^{103}\) ‘Campaigning for a better game: Annual Review 2011-12’ p. 16

\(^{104}\) ‘Ambassadors for Change: Annual Review 2010-11’ p. 7

\(^{105}\) Ibid.

\(^{106}\) ‘English Football’s Inclusion and Anti-Discrimination Action Plan’ p. 5
players’. The campaign has achieved this partially through its ‘Streetkick’ programme and free weekly coaching sessions through which ‘promising young players have been recommended to the Sheffield United School of Excellence’.

Additionally, FURD describes one of its ‘key tasks’ as offering ‘help and support’ to ethnic minority footballers in organising teams and entering into local leagues. One such team is Sharrow United FC. This team is predominantly ‘made up of local Asian youths’ and highlights the work done to increase participation amongst this section of Sheffield’s community. These measures have been effective in increasing BAME participation in football in Sheffield as well as in creating chances for these players to progress to professional levels. FURD has overcome poorly scouted all-Asian leagues by forming teams, such as Sharrow United FC, who participate in mainstream local leagues and recommending players for academies in Sheffield. FURD has, therefore, been predominantly effective in its aim to increase BAME participation but its efforts cannot provide effective results at a professional level without clubs extending their scouting networks and giving recommended Asian players a chance.

Ultimately, the statistics, which show the lack of Asian participation in professional football, are evidence enough of the ineffectiveness of anti-racism campaigns in addressing the issue. KIO has been unable to enforce the implementation of scouting networks and initiatives, which focus on Asian players, except at a handful of the ninety-two professional clubs. Consequently, the Asian community is still largely excluded from routes into professional football. FURD has been effective in offering opportunities to its own Asian community but,

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108 Ibid., p. 6
109 Ibid.
110 Bradbury Football Unites, Racism Divides p. 30
111 ‘Football Unites, Racism Divides, The first 10 years 1995-2005’ p. 8
as a local project, it is unable to dramatically increase the number of professional Asian players nationally. It is, therefore, fair to conclude that, despite being in existence for twenty years, anti-racism campaigns have been ineffective in increasing the number of Asian professional players to a level reflective of the multicultural make-up of society.

Conclusion

The failure of clubs to adopt measures, encouraged by KIO, has meant that anti-racism campaigns have been ineffective in eliminating racial concerns from the lives of players. Racist abuse between players has persisted due to the lack of appropriate sanctions, which would discourage the use of racism, as well as a lack of educational measures, which could tackle the underlying causes. Similarly, Asian players are still unable to make the mass breakthrough into the professional game due to a lack of initiatives and scouting measures employed by clubs. As a result, anti-racism campaigns have been largely ineffective in eradicating racism from this area of the game.
Chapter Three – Institutional Racism

Defining Institutional Racism

Institutional racism is much harder to identify than overt forms of racism displayed by players and fans. Therefore, it is necessary to have a clear definition of what this chapter means when it refers to this form of racism. The Macpherson Report, which emerged from ‘The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry’ in February 1999, provides this as it defines institutional racism in the following way:

‘The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people.’

Introduction

Despite the majority of academic work on racism in English football initially maintaining focus on fan behaviour, important studies, such as *Racism and Anti-Racism in Football* by Garland and Rowe and *The Changing Face of Football* by Back, Crabbe and Solomos, shifted concentration to more covert forms of racism. Institutional racism in football has, therefore, more recently emerged as an important topic of debate. This trend is reflective of the way in which institutional racism has ‘been brought sharply into focus’ in politics following the Macpherson Report, released in 1999. However, despite KIO and FURD also beginning to place more emphasis on this aspect of racism within football, BAME people are still heavily

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under-represented as members of the boardroom and as football managers. This is evidence of the fact that these campaigns have been ineffective in encouraging a large portion of clubs, as well as the FA, to adopt, and appropriately implement, equal opportunities policies (EOPs).

Institutional Racism – Professional Clubs and the Football Association

Simon Gardiner and Roger Welch correctly highlight that ‘the glass ceiling of structural barriers continues to obstruct the ability of those from minority ethnic groups to rise into positions of influence and power in football administration’.\(^{114}\) The latest available statistics on the subject are evidence of this as a 2004 survey by the CRE found that all members of the FA board and FA council ‘described themselves as white’.\(^{115}\) It was also discovered that only one director within nineteen responding Premier League clubs was ‘non-white’.\(^{116}\) This is despite point nine of KIO’s original ten point plan (see appendix one) revealing that the campaign has been attempting to address this problem, in relation to clubs, since 1993.

The institutional racism evident here has its roots in society. Blatant discrimination was used by employers who were reluctant to recruit ‘immigrants’ upon their arrival to Britain during the 1950s and 1960s.\(^{117}\) Furthermore, until 1968, this ‘racial discrimination in employment was lawful’ and the preference for white employees was seen as ‘natural and legitimate’.\(^{118}\) Despite the 1968 Race Relations Act making this preference illegal, a survey published by


\(^{116}\) Ibid., p. 11

\(^{117}\) Solomos and Back Racism and Society p. 69

the Policy Studies Institute, in 1984, found that black people were still paid less than ‘white workers in comparable job levels’, were ‘concentrated in the same industries as they were 25 years earlier’ and were ‘generally employed below their qualification and skill level’. Following protests from women and the black population, in the 1980s, ‘Equal opportunities policies’ began to be implemented in an attempt to address the problem. However, as Solomos makes clear, there is still ‘little evidence of significant advances against entrenched forms of racial inequality.’

The statistics previously discussed are evidence, therefore, that the situation within football reflects that of society. Institutional racism is still present and, between 1993 and 2004, KIO even struggled to encourage clubs to ‘adopt an equal opportunities policy in relation to employment’. The CRE survey revealed that, after eleven years, KIO had failed to inspire all Premier League clubs to adopt EOPs with only ‘89%’ of clubs responding claiming to have one. KIO’s success rate in lower divisions was even worse with ‘79%’ of clubs from Division One, ‘75%’ of clubs from Division Two and a mere ‘45%’ of clubs from Division Three claiming to have EOPs. FURD successfully helped Sheffield United draw up its ‘equal opportunities policy’, adopted in May 1999, but, as a local organisation, it cannot have a vast impact on the increasing the employment of BAME staff across football.

In the wake of this poor initial implementation of EOPs, KIO’s focus has been drawn more heavily to the issue recently and the campaign has renewed its push to encourage

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119 Solomos and Back *Racism and Society* p. 69
121 Solomos and Back *Racism and Society* p. 78
123 *Racial Equality in Football: A Survey* p. 6
124 Ibid., p. 13-18
professional clubs to attain the ‘Equality Standard’.\textsuperscript{126} However, Arsenal and Aston Villa are the only two professional football clubs to have achieved the highest level.\textsuperscript{127} The Equality Standard has also, as of yet, not been heavily adopted by Football League clubs. In 2008/09, only fifteen clubs in the entire Football League had achieved the ‘Preliminary Level’.\textsuperscript{128} Until now, therefore, KIO has been relatively ineffective in ensuring clubs follow EOPs and, as a result, has not managed to eliminate institutional racism from football.

Despite the insufficient application of EOPs among professional clubs, the FA ‘signed the Sporting Equals Racial Equality Charter in 2002 and achieved the Preliminary Level in January 2003’.\textsuperscript{129} Yet, despite this, it is only since Heather Rabbatts joined the FA, in December 2011, that there has ‘been an ethnic minority face in an influential, decision-making position’.\textsuperscript{130} A survey conducted by the FA in 2003 also found that only ‘2.2%’ of its referees were from an ethnic minority group. This shows a clear under-representation in comparison to the multicultural composition of society as, in 2001, 8.7% of the population of England and Wales was non-White.\textsuperscript{131} These statistics, therefore, also highlight that, despite the use of an EOP, KIO has been ineffective in eliminating institutional racism and increasing the number of BAME staff within the FA to a level reflective of society.

This failure, to effectively implement EOPs and give rise to an increase in BAME staff, can be seen as indicative of the way in which a number of clubs and the FA have failed to fully commit to the work of anti-racism. In 2007, the Independent Football Commission noted

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{126} ‘Ambassadors for Change: Annual Review 2010-11’ p. 14}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{127} ‘Campaigning for a better game: Annual Review 2011-12’ p. 4}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{128} ‘Kick It Out Annual Report 2008-09’ p. 3}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{129} Sheffield, Football Unites, Racism Divides Resource Library, Foot 116, ‘Football Association Ethics and Sports Equity Strategy’, p. 4}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{130} Hattenstone ‘Racism in football: putting the boot in’ \textit{Guardian} 13 July 2012}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{131} ‘Ethnicity and National Identity in England and Wales 2011’ p. 4}
that ‘many clubs have a single week of racism awareness and little else’. This observation corresponds with the findings of this study. It has been evident throughout this piece that clubs have not appropriately sanctioned their players, not always engaged with their BAME communities and have, in addition, not recruited a substantial number of non-White staff. Similarly, the FA has not sufficiently challenged the structural racism within its own organisation and has failed to appropriately sanction players and clubs for racial offences. It is harsh to criticise KIO too heavily for the failings of others surrounding anti-racism within football. However, it is true that the campaign has been ineffective in eliminating institutional racism from clubs and the FA.

Ultimately, this ‘prejudice within boardrooms is a legacy of attitudes and practices that are commonplace in society as a whole’. However, hopefully, through the implementation of the FA’s new ‘Inclusion and Anti-Discrimination Action Plan’, football can begin to lead the fight against institutional racism in society. This plan calls for an ‘open and transparent process in...recruiting the football workforce’. It also hopes to ‘ensure that 10% of the national referee workforce’ is from BAME communities. Additionally, it aims to guarantee that clubs complete the ‘Equality monitoring tool to provide accurate statistics on their staff’. It remains to be seen how efficiently KIO and the FA can implement these measures, however, and, so far, anti-racism campaigns have been ineffective in eliminating institutional racism from football.

133 Vasili Colouring Over The White Line p. 194
134 ‘English Football’s Inclusion and Anti-Discrimination Action Plan’
135 Ibid., p. 4
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid., p. 10
Under-Representation of Black and Minority Ethnic Football Managers

Institutional racism is also evident within the world of football management. Tony Collins became the first black manager of a professional club in Britain when he took charge of Rochdale in 1960.\(^{138}\) Despite this occurring more than fifty years ago, only a handful of BAME managers have followed since. Back, Crabbe and Solomos believe that the racist stereotyping, to which the Macpherson Report refers, is a significant reason for this as black players, who were once labelled as ‘lazy’ or ‘unable to play in the cold’, are now viewed to be unable to ‘cope with the organizational load of football management and its associated responsibilities.’\(^{139}\) Additionally, Ian Cook believes that the ‘unwitting and unconscious’ racism, which Macpherson describes in his report, is something that occurs when chairmen choose managers.\(^{140}\) It is difficult to know the precise reasons but it is clear that institutional racism, whether ‘through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness’ or racist stereotyping, is, at least partially, responsible for the lack of BAME managers.\(^{141}\)

Colin King correctly highlights that this issue is not isolated to managerial positions in football and points out that, as previously noted, ‘sport mirrors the types of structural racism in society’.\(^{142}\) He comments on the imposition of a ‘glass ceiling’ which prevents black people moving into high profile positions.\(^{143}\) This glass ceiling is evident in institutions such as the Police force where ‘(BAME) officers account for just 2.8% of officers at Association of

\(^{138}\) Garland and Rowe Racism and Anti-Racism in Football p. 38
\(^{139}\) Back, Crabbe and Solomos, The Changing Face of Football p. 34-35
\(^{141}\) The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry by Sir William Macpherson of Cluny
\(^{142}\) King, Colin, Offside Racism: Playing the White Man (Oxford: Berg, 2004), p. 28
\(^{143}\) Ibid.
Chief Police Officers (ACPO) rank. In this sense, English football is no worse than many organisations and industries in England in recruiting BAME staff. However, having had active anti-racism campaigns since 1993, much more progress should have been made.

This is especially so as, point nine of Kick It Out’s original ten-point plan (see appendix one), drawn up in 1993, attempted to solve problems of institutional racism within clubs. However, as of 17th March 2013, the following five are the only BAME managers in the English professional divisions:

![Figure 2: Norwich City F.C. Manager: Chris Hughton](image)

![Figure 3: Blackpool F.C. Manager: Paul Ince](image)

![Figure 4: Barnet F.C. Player-Manager: Edgar Davids](image)

![Figure 5: Charlton Athletic F.C. Manager: Chris Powell](image)

![Figure 6: Notts County F.C. Manager: Chris Kiwomya](image)

This equates to only 4.6% of managers in these divisions being non-white. This is despite the Office for National Statistics revealing, in 2011, that fourteen per cent of the population of England and Wales is BAME. Twenty years on from KIO’s inception, anti-racism campaigns

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145 “Ethnicity and National Identity in England and Wales 2011” p. 3
have failed to be effective in solving this under-representation in professional football management positions.

KIO has recognised the need for an ‘equal opportunities policy in relation to employment’ since its inception.\textsuperscript{146} It has also been aware of the issue of BAME under-representation in coaching and management since at least 1998, when the campaign contributed to a report by the Football Task Force which stated that the FA should ‘set targets for increasing the number of black and Asian qualified FA coaches’.\textsuperscript{147} Despite this, it is only in the last few years that the issue has moved towards the top of KIO’s priorities. In his 2004 publication, King stated that ‘preoccupation with the delayed emergence of Asian players distracts’ from English clubs’ refusal to inspire the transition of black players into coaching and management.’\textsuperscript{148} This is a valid argument but the complete lack of success in bringing through Asian professional footballers suggests that, until recently, this issue has not been focused on significantly either. It is more accurate to suggest that anti-racism campaigns focused too much on overt racism in stadia and that this acted as ‘a distraction to revealing the institutional barriers faced in management’.\textsuperscript{149}

To their credit, KIO has recognised that ‘imbalance in the game still remain’ and has taken more notice of the issue in recent years.\textsuperscript{150} Their 2008/09 annual report states that the campaign had taken active involvement in the PFA ‘Black Coaches Forum’.\textsuperscript{151} In addition to this, KIO was involved in the formation of ‘The Black and Asian Coaches Association (BACA)’, in January 2010, which seeks to ‘address the under representation of minority communities

\textsuperscript{146} ‘Kick It Out Annual Report 1997/98’ p. 12  
\textsuperscript{147} ‘Eliminating Racism From Football: A report by the Football Task Force’ p. 5  
\textsuperscript{148} King, \textit{Offside Racism} p. 28  
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., p. 77  
\textsuperscript{150} ‘Ambassadors for Change: Annual Review 2010-11’ p. 17  
\textsuperscript{151} ‘Kick It Out Annual Report 2008-09’ p. 3
in coaching’. BACA supports the ‘Rooney Rule’ which has been successful in increasing the number of BAME head coaches in the NFL. This rule would require clubs to interview at least one minority candidate for each management position and could be a big step forward in addressing BAME under-representation. Recent actions are hopefully a sign that KIO is beginning to become effective in dealing with the issue.

Locally, Football Unites, Racism Divides has, throughout its history, proved to be effective in providing training in coaching and management for BAME people. Their 1998 evaluation report reveals that they ‘enabled a group of young local Somali men to acquire a nationally recognised football coaching qualification.’ This success is further supplemented by their 2003 review which reveals that they offered ‘free access to all FA coaching courses’ and had ‘one Level 3 coach, 8 Level 2s and scores of young people who have reached Level 1’.

Finally, their most recently accessible Newsletter, from 2011, states that FURD, in partnership with Sheffield and Hallamshire County FA, ‘organised its first FA level 1 Certificate in Coaching Football course’ from which fifteen young people gained qualifications. Unfortunately, despite this success, FURD only has the resources to be effective at a local level. Until KIO and the FA break the glass ceiling which is preventing an influx of BAME managers, the work of FURD will be largely ineffective in the professional game as their qualified coaches will struggle to find employment.

As a result, despite their newly progressive work, KIO’s initial lack of focus on the issue has meant that anti-racism campaigns have been ineffective in eliminating institutional racism.

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152 ‘Ambassadors for Change: Annual Review 2010-11’ p. 6
153 Bains Football Unites, Racism Divides, Evaluation Report p. 10
from the processes involved in employing professional football managers. The failure to increase the number of BAME managers by more than a few per cent, despite an increasingly large non-white population, a swelling number of retired black professional players and a growing number of BAME qualified coaches, is evidence of this. Signs for the future look more promising, however, as the FA, Premier League, Football League and League Manager’s Association all committed, in 2012, to expanding the number of BAME qualified coaches.\textsuperscript{156} This, alongside KIO’s growing relationship with BACA and FURD’s continually impressive work, indicates that the issue may be finally being addressed. However, it will take a number of years to know if this is actually the case.

Conclusion

KIO has, therefore, been ineffective in addressing the institutional barriers which have blocked the rise of BAME people into positions within football management and the boardroom. The campaign has also failed in encouraging all clubs to gain its Equality Standard and has done little to address the structural racism within the FA. FURD was able to encourage Sheffield United to implement an EOP and has also made strides in providing training for BAME coaches. However, without KIO successfully removing the structural barriers which exist within the game, anti-racism campaigns will be ineffective in increasing the number of BAME managers in professional football.

\textsuperscript{156}‘English Football’s Inclusion and Anti-Discrimination Action Plan’
Conclusion

This study has shown that anti-racism campaigns have been largely ineffective in eliminating racism from English football. Despite making some progress in reducing overt racism among supporters through the use of sanctions, KIO and FURD have failed to challenge the underlying societal causes of this behaviour. These organisations have also been unsuccessful in tackling the use of overt racism between players. This has been the result of failing to impose sufficient sanctions, to reduce the problem, and not introducing educational initiatives to tackle the racist attitudes behind expressions of abuse. Without recognising that the use of overt racism has its origins in wider society, campaigns will be ineffective in addressing this problem among players and supporters. Only by challenging these underlying attitudes through educational measures can KIO and FURD begin to be successful in achieving their aims.

Additionally, anti-racism campaigns have been predominantly ineffective in eliminating more subtle forms of racism. This is evident from the fact that BAME people are still heavily under-represented as supporters, members of the boardroom and football managers. It is also apparent from the under-representation of Asian professional players. KIO and FURD have been unsuccessful in eradicating racism in this respect largely due to their failure to inspire clubs to fully embrace their anti-racist message. This is evident from the way in which KIO has not managed to encourage clubs to introduce scouting networks and initiatives to increase the number of Asian professional players. It is also highlighted by how clubs have resisted the implementation of KIO’s Equality Standard. By proving unable to encourage clubs to introduce these measures, anti-racism organisations have been ineffective in removing the institutional barriers which obstruct BAME people from gaining
prominent roles in football. As a result of these failures, in removing overt and covert forms of racism, anti-racism campaigns have predominantly proved to be ineffective in eliminating racism from English football.
Appendices

Appendix One – Kick It Out’s Original Ten-Point Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Let’s Kick Racism Out of Football’s’ Ten-Point Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To issue a statement saying the club will not tolerate racism, spelling out the action it will take against those engaged in racist chanting. The statement should be printed in all match programmes and displayed permanently and prominently around the ground.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Make public address announcements condemning racist chanting at matches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Make it a condition for season ticket holders that they do not take part in racist abuse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Take action to prevent the sale of racist literature inside and around the ground.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Take disciplinary action against players who engage in racial abuse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Contact other clubs to make sure they understand the club’s policy on racism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Encourage a common strategy between stewards and police for dealing with racist abuse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Remove all racist graffiti from the ground as a matter of urgency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Adopt an equal opportunities policy in relation to employment and service provision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Work with all other groups and agencies, such as the Professional Footballers Association, supporters, schools, voluntary organisations, youth club, sponsors, local authorities, local businesses and police, to develop pro-active programmes and make progress to raise awareness of campaigning to eliminate racial abuse and discrimination.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix Two – List of Professional Players Accused of Racial Abusing an Opponent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Player Accused</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Peter Schmeichel[^158]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Steve Harkness[^159]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Neil Ruddock[^160]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>John Mackie[^161]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Andreas Lipa[^162]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Duncan Ferguson[^163]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Emre[^164] for a second time[^165]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Joey Barton[^166]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>An unnamed Crystal Palace player[^167]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Luis Suarez[^168]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>John Terry[^169]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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**Figure 6:** Notts County F.C. Manager: Chris Kiwomya, http://www1.skysports.com/football/news/26060/8643912/Kiwomya-planning-for-new-term

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“I Robert Earl declare that the above work is my own and that the material contained herein has not been substantially used in any other submission for an academic award”.

Robert Earl